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We focus on downstream uses that combine multiple intellectual
property rights and examine the e⁄ects of introducing an intellectual
property clearinghouse that reduces transaction costs associated with
licensing. We show that this causes equilibrium royalties to rise in
some cases and may harm licensors because clearinghouse by itself
does not eliminate the ￿ tragedy of the anticommons￿ . Downstream
welfare e⁄ects may also be positive or negative and we characterise the
e⁄ects on downstream manufacturers and ￿nal consumers. We also
show that total welfare is most likely to increase following a transaction
cost reduction when the number of intellectual property rights per
downstream use is small, or if rights are relatively substitutable in
downstream use, but it is also possible for welfare to decrease.
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11 Introduction
A clear trend in intellectual property (IP) is the growth of licensing for down-
stream uses, as indicated by various studies and surveys such as Razgaitis
(2005) and Athreye and Cantwell (2007). The implication is that ￿ markets
for technology￿(Arora et al, 2001), where innovations are licensed, are be-
coming increasingly important in the use and development of IP. This paper
examines the e⁄ects of introducing a ￿ clearinghouse￿that reduces transaction
costs in IP licensing on market e¢ ciency in both a market for technology
and downstream markets.
A proliferation of IP rights may result in a ￿ thicket￿(Shapiro, 2001) that
can increase costs for development of downstream products that require the
use of multiple existing innovations. This issue can arise in high-technology
industries such as information technology and biomedicine, as well as content
aggregation industries such as radio and television broadcasters and online
news providers. To give a speci￿c example, Verbeure et al (2006) describe
how genetic diagnostic tests are based on detecting mutations in candidate
genes. A single genetic disease can be associated with mutations in many
di⁄erent genes, and an accurate test must check most or all of these. Since
gene sequences as well as technologies for amplifying, labelling and detecting
sequences can be patented, a new genetic diagnostic test potentially requires
licenses to many existing IP rights typically from many di⁄erent licensors.
There are well-known transaction costs associated with licensing (see, for
example, Teece 1977), and these costs are likely to increase with the number
of licensing agreements required. In addition, if multiple IP rights are com-
plementary in downstream production, the ￿ tragedy of the anticommons￿
(Heller & Eisenberg, 1998, Buchanan & Yoon, 2000) may result in license
fees that are excessively high. Both the costs of the licensing process and
this ￿ tragedy￿may result in lower utilization of IP in terms of downstream
use. Due to these issues, a number of ￿ collective rights￿institutions (Merges,
1996) aim to improve e¢ ciency in licensing. Patent pools may help to solve
the coordination problem among IP owners that leads to the tragedy of the
anticommons. Copyright collectives such as the American Society of Com-
posers and Performers (ASCAP) provide licenses to a bundle of works using
standardized contracts and exploit economies of scale in the licensing and
monitoring process.
To address the problem of multiple IPs for downstream use, a number of
authors have promoted the idea of IP ￿ clearinghouses￿that act as intermedi-
aries in the licensing process.1 As we will discuss, these clearinghouses can
potentially provide a range of services in markets for technology, from sim-
ple searchable databases of available IP, through to packaging and licensing
1See van Zimmeren et al (2006), Van Overwalle et al (2006), OECD (2002), and Gra⁄
& Zilberman (2001).
2IP on behalf of owners. In Aoki and Schi⁄ (2007) we identify 15 existing
third-party clearinghouses (not including copyright collectives). These range
from straightforward patent search engines like the Google patent search2,
to more sophisticated exchange platforms for licensable technologies such as
BirchBob3 and Yet2.com.
However, there has been little economic analysis of such clearinghouses.
In this paper we concentrate on the e⁄ects that a clearinghouse might have
due to reducing transaction costs on license fees and welfare. We use a simple
licensing model in which there is a range of potential uses of existing IP
rights that are available for licensing. Each downstream use requires license
to a number of IP rights, and these rights may be substitutable to some
extent in downstream production. We assume negotiating licenses requires
incurring ￿xed transaction costs, and downstream uses will be exploited if
it is pro￿table for a monopolist to do so. Royalties are set independently by
IP owners, so the tragedy of the anticommons occurs in some cases.
An important observation from this model is the role played by the
transaction costs in the determination of royalties. Since a manufacturer will
not produce anything unless its variable pro￿t can at least cover these costs,
the transaction costs can act like a disciplining device on the royalties set
by IP owners, and help to o⁄set the tragedy of the anticommons if it occurs.
Given this, a reduction in transaction costs by a clearinghouse has three
potentially o⁄setting welfare e⁄ects. New products will be produced, and
real resource costs of licensing are reduced, but higher royalties ￿ ow through
into downstream retail prices, which reduces consumption and welfare.
We show that a reduction in transaction costs can make IP owners worse
o⁄ in aggregate if the substitutability of IP rights is su¢ ciently low, so that
the tragedy of the anticommons causes royalties to rise by a relatively large
amount. On the other hand, downstream manufacturers are always better
o⁄ in aggregate, as the increase in royalties never exceeds the gains that
they make from the reduced licensing costs. Consumers may also be worse
o⁄, as the increases in per-unit royalties ￿ ow through to higher downstream
retail prices, and the resulting losses to consumers of existing products can
exceed the gains from the introduction of new products. The overall e⁄ect
on total welfare is ambiguous, with a reduction in licensing costs possibly
causing a reduction in equilibrium welfare if substitutability of IP rights is
low, if the number of IP rights per downstream product is high, or if the
licensing cost reduction is small.
These welfare e⁄ects are not spread uniformly across downstream mar-
kets. We di⁄erentiate downstream markets according to their level of de-
mand. Negative welfare e⁄ects can occur in markets with moderate levels of
downstream demand, where demand is su¢ ciently high that production oc-
2www.google.com/patents
3www.birchbob.com
3curs prior to a transaction cost reduction, but where demand is low enough
that transaction costs constrain the level of equilibrium royalties. In such
markets, equilibrium royalties rise when licensing costs reduce, which can
make IP owners worse o⁄ if the new royalties are su¢ ciently high. We
show that under some conditions, some IP owners will not want to use a
clearinghouse even if it is free.
There is an extensive existing literature on the incentives of innovators
to license their IP and optimal licensing contracts.4 In this paper we take
the licensing decision as given, and focus on the outcome of the licensing
process. Within the licensing literature, Arora & Fosfuri (2003) show, as
we do, that reducing transaction costs leads to more licensing, but they do
not examine the welfare implications of this. There is also a small economic
literature on copyright collectives, which focuses on the e⁄ects of these col-
lectives on incentives to create copyrighted works, and the level of royalties
set by the collectives.5 Similarly, the literature on patent pools examines the
centralized royalties set by a pool and the incentives for pool formation.6 In
contrast, we focus on the e⁄ects of transaction costs on decentralized licens-
ing. Finally, Aoki (2006) considers IP clearinghouses as network providers
and examines the demand for and stability of these systems in contrast with
patent pools, while in this paper we focus on general e⁄ects of transaction
cost reductions in a market for technologies.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. The next section
brie￿ y describes IP clearinghouses and their role in the licensing process.7
Section 3 presents a simple licensing model and section 4 characterizes the
equilibrium of the model. Then section 5 examines what happens in equi-
librium when transaction costs are reduced. Section 6 o⁄ers concluding
comments and suggestions for future work.
2 Intellectual Property Clearinghouses
Clearinghouses act like intermediaries in the licensing process. For example,
van Zimmeren et al (2006) promote the idea of establishing a clearinghouse
of biotechnology IP, to assist the development of new genetic diagnostic tests
and other advances that require licenses to multiple existing IP rights. A
concrete example of a third-party clearinghouse is Yet2.com. It was founded
in 1999 with joint investment from Siemens, Bayer, Honeywell, Dupont,
Procter & Gamble, Caterpillar, and NTT Leasing. It describes itself as a
￿ technology marketplace￿and provides an online platform where technologies
that available for licensing can be listed and searched.
4For example, Gallini and Wright (1990) and Katz and Shapiro (1985).
5Besen et al (1992), Kleit (2000), Hollander (1984).
6See, for example, Lerner & Tirole (2004) and Aoki & Nagaoka (2005).
7More detailed descriptions and discussion are contained in Aoki & Schi⁄ (2007).
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Figure 1: Classi￿cation of clearinghouses (from Aoki & Schi⁄, 2007).
Yet2.com operates independently and raises revenue from both poten-
tial licensors and licensees. Potential licensees can perform basic searches
of listed technologies for free, but more advanced searching and viewing
complete details of listings requires purchasing a subscription. Listing tech-
nologies also requires a subscription, and Yet2.com charges a commission on
any successful licensing arrangement made as a result of its services.
The potential functions of clearinghouses are discussed by van Zimmeren
et al (2006). These range from simply providing information about existing
IP through to issuing standardized licenses and collecting royalties on be-
half of IP owners. In our view, the most important functional distinction is
whether or not the clearinghouse sells licenses on behalf of IP owners. This
is because centralization of licensing is necessary to solve the coordination
problem that leads to the tragedy of the anticommons, if it occurs. Another
important distinction is whether the clearinghouse exists as an independent
third-party or operates on a collective basis on behalf of IP owners, as this
will a⁄ect its incentives. In Aoki & Schi⁄ (2007) we therefore propose a
broad classi￿cation of clearinghouses into four groups, as shown in Figure
1. Within this classi￿cation, Yet2.com is a third-party informational clear-
inghouse (type I), and copyright collectives such as ASCAP are collective
licensing clearinghouses (type IV). We are not aware of any type II or III
clearinghouses that cover a broad range of IP, although some patent pools
for speci￿c technologies are administered by third-parties (type II).8 Types
II and IV could be considered as collective rights organizations (Merges,
1996).
The functional dimension of this classi￿cation makes clear the two pos-
sible roles of a clearinghouse: coordination and transaction cost reduction.
In this paper we focus on the latter.9 There are a number of ways that
a clearinghouse may be able to reduce transaction costs. First, a clearing-
8Aoki & Nagaoka (2005) describe the operation of several existing patent pools.
9The basic coordination issue is the same as that dealt with in the literature on patent
pools. See, for example, Lerner & Tirole (2004).
5house can spread the costs of the platform used for searching and identifying
existing IP rights over its user base. As a result, it may also be economic
for it to deploy a more sophisticated search technology than individual users
could implement. Second, a clearinghouse may be able to apply technolog-
ical and legal expertise to assist with licensing and reduce the complexities
of the process. Third, if a clearinghouse conducts licensing on behalf of
IP owners, it may be able to exploit economies of scale in this process, as
certain elements of the contracts and negotiations may be common across
technologies.
3 The Model
There is a continuum of downstream products that can be produced. Prod-
ucts are independent of each other and di⁄er by the level of their demand.
Each product has a linear demand and the intercept di⁄ers across products,
so demand for a particular product is given by
p = ￿ ￿ q,
where p is the retail price for this product and q is the quantity sold. The
parameter ￿ di⁄ers by product and is distributed uniformly on [0;A].
Each downstream product is manufactured by an independent monop-
olist.10 Each monopolist requires licenses from n = 1;2;3;::: independent
upstream IP owners. These n IP rights are speci￿c to a single downstream
use.11 For a given downstream market, let xi be the ￿ quantity￿of IP right i











where ￿ 2 (￿1;0) [ (0;1]. If ￿ = 1, IP rights are perfect substitutes and
in the limit as ￿ ! ￿1 they are perfect complements. We assume n and ￿
are the same for all downstream markets.12
For a given downstream market, each of the n independent IP owners








10Within our model, a downstream monopoly is the optimal licensing structure for the
IP owners.
11Alternatively, if IP rights have multiple downstream uses, we assume that an IP owner
sets royalties for each downstream use independently.
12Without this assumption, we would need to make additional assumptions about the
distribution of n and ￿ across downstream markets. We cannot see any basis for any
particular relationship between ￿, ￿ and n, so such assumptions would necessarily be
arbitrary and would complicate the analysis.
6Aside from royalties, we assume that manufacturers have no other variable
costs. With the CES production function, the solution to a manufacturer￿ s
cost minimization problem gives a total variable cost of c(q) = z
￿￿1
￿ q.
Each manufacturer must also pay a ￿xed transaction cost of s(n) ￿ 0 to
identify and locate IP owners and negotiate licenses with them.13 This cost
is not sunk until the licensing process is initiated. We assume that s(n) is








q ￿ s(n). (1)
We will assume that manufacturers in at least some markets make strictly
positive pro￿ts in equilibrium. This will require that demand in some mar-
kets is su¢ ciently high, and in particular we assume that
A >




Upstream, the n IP owners for each downstream market set royalties
simultaneously and independently to maximize their royalty revenues. The
timing is that IP owners set and announce royalties ￿rst. The downstream
monopolists then take these royalties as given and choose whether or not to
incur s(n), and if so, the quantity of output to produce.
4 Equilibrium
Under our assumptions the downstream markets are completely indepen-
dent. We characterize the equilibrium for a given ￿ by ￿rst solving the
downstream manufacturer￿ s pro￿t maximization problem taking the royal-
ties as given. We then solve the simultaneous game among the n IP owners
for this market to determine the equilibrium royalties.
Given the downstream pro￿t function (1), if production of a given prod-


















13We assume all ￿xed licensing costs are borne by downstream manufacturers and not
IP owners. This is because our analysis starts after IP owners have already commited
to license their IP, and thus making them bear some part of the licensing costs will not
change their behavior in the model. As long as downstream manufacturers incur some
proportion of the licensing costs, the basic qualitative results of our model will continue
to hold.






otherwise the manufacturer will choose not to incur the ￿xed cost s(n)
and will produce nothing. Note that even if all royalties are zero for this
product, production is not pro￿table unless ￿ ￿ 2
p
s(n). The presence
of the transaction costs restricts the set of products that are produced,
regardless of royalties. We thus de￿ne ￿ = 2
p
s(n).
If the manufacturer does produce some quantity q > 0, given the CES
production function, the demand for licenses from IP right i is xi = ￿iq,















The term ￿i captures the possibilities for substitution of IP rights. Demand
for IP right i always decreases in ri due to manufacturer substitution towards
other IP rights (￿i reduces), and due to a reduction in production as the
marginal cost increases (qM reduces). On the other hand, across IP rights,
xi may increase or decrease in response to an increase in rj, since these
substitution and quantity e⁄ects work in opposite directions.
Upstream, the royalty revenues of IP owner i are
Ri = xiri. (6)
Given the symmetry of our setup, we concentrate on symmetric equilibria
where ri = r￿ for all i, for a given ￿. The following result is useful for
characterizing the equilibria.
Lemma 1 If ￿ > 1=n, at any symmetric royalty r > 0 where downstream
production is pro￿table, any individual IP owner has an incentive to under-
cut, that is, Ri is maximized for ri < r.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Intuitively, when ￿ is high, IP rights are relatively substitutable. At a
symmetric royalty, when ￿ > 1=n, substitution between IP rights by manu-
facturers is so strong that a unilateral royalty reduction is always pro￿table
for any individual IP owner. This drives equilibrium royalties to zero in
all markets. The following proposition characterizes the symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium royalties.14
14There are also uninteresting symmetric equilibria that we ignore. For example, if ri =
r for all i and r is very large, downstream production will not occur, but no IP owner will be
able to make production pro￿table by unilaterally reducing ri, thus r is an equilibrium,
and there will be a multiplicity of such equilibria. In addition, when the downstream
pro￿tability constraint binds in equilibrium, there may be multiple asymmetric equilibria
that satisfy this constraint, which we also ignore.
8Proposition 1 For 1=n < ￿ ￿ 1, symmetric equilibrium royalties are zero.



























Proof. In the Appendix.
If ￿ ￿ 1=n, equilibrium royalties are unconstrained by downstream man-
ufacturer pro￿tability if demand (￿) is su¢ ciently high.15 Otherwise, equi-
librium royalties in markets for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ are constrained to the level at
which the manufacturer just breaks even. Observe that r￿ (￿) is an increas-
ing piecewise linear function of ￿ and it is straightforward to verify that it
is continuous in ￿. From now on we will assume that ￿ ￿ 1=n, as a change
in transaction costs will not a⁄ect the equilibrium if ￿ > 1=n.
In this model, the ￿ tragedy of the anticommons￿occurs for a given down-
stream market if the equilibrium royalty exceeds the level that maximizes
the royalty revenues of the IP owners in that market. Let e r denote the
symmetric jointly optimal royalty for a given ￿. To characterize e r, at a
symmetric royalty r, from (5) the demand for each IP right becomes a






























Let us de￿ne ￿(n) = r￿=e r as the ratio of the equilibrium royalty to
the (unconstrained) joint optimum for a given n, so the tragedy of the
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(10)
15Our earlier assumption (2) guarantees that A > ￿.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium (r￿) and unconstrained jointly optimal (e r) royalties
as a function of the demand intercept (￿) assuming n ￿ 2.
Proposition 2 The tragedy of the anticommons occurs for a given down-
stream market if n ￿ 2, ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 4
p
s(n). Otherwise, the equilibrium
royalty in that market is lower than the joint optimum.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Intuitively, the equilibrium royalty exceeds the joint optimum if substi-
tutability of IP rights is low, there are at least two licensors per downstream
market, and the downstream pro￿tability constraint is not very severe.16
Figure 2 illustrates r￿ and e r for di⁄erent products, depending on the value
of ￿, assuming that n ￿ 2.
It is also interesting to investigate how changes in the number of IP
rights per downstream market and the substitutability of rights a⁄ect the
ratio ￿. From (10) we have























(￿+n￿￿2)2 for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A
0 for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
which give the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When the downstream pro￿tability constraint does not bind
(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A), adding an additional IP right causes ￿ to increase when ￿ < 0
16These results also indicate that joint setting of royalties by a patent pool will not
be welfare enhancing for a given downstream market when patents are su¢ ciently sub-
stitutable (￿ > 0), while it may or may not enhance welfare when patents are less sub-
stitutable (￿ < 0). Similar results are obtained in a di⁄erent framework by Lerner and
Tirole (2004).
10and to decrease when ￿ > 0, while increasing the substitutability of rights
decreases ￿. If the downstream pro￿tability constraint binds (￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿), ￿
decreases when n increases under the assumption that s(n) is an increasing
function, and is independent of ￿.
Proposition 3 says that if downstream pro￿tability is not a factor in equi-
librium, then an increase in n increases the ratio of equilibrium royalties to
the joint optimum when ￿ < 0, while the opposite occurs when ￿ > 0.
In either case, the equilibrium royalty moves further away from the joint
optimum, thus IP owners are always hurt by an increase in n, but the mech-
anism di⁄ers depending on whether the tragedy of the anticommons occurs
or not. If ￿ < 0, the tragedy of the anticommons occurs in these markets,
and adding another IP right only makes it worse. On the other hand, if
￿ > 0, the tragedy does not occur and adding another IP right stimulates
competition among IP owners in the sense that royalties fall relative to the
joint optimum. For markets that are pro￿t constrained, regardless of the
value of ￿, increasing n reduces equilibrium royalties, as the downstream
pro￿t constraint becomes more severe. If the tragedy of the anticommons
occurs in such markets, this can make IP owners better o⁄, as a more severe
constraint may bring royalties closer to the joint optimum.
5 E⁄ect of a Transaction Cost Reduction
In this section we examine the e⁄ects on the equilibrium of the model of
reducing transaction costs from s0 (n) to s1 (n) < s0 (n) for all n. Let us
de￿ne ￿0 and ￿1 as the respective values of ￿ given s0 (n) and s1 (n), and
similarly de￿ne ￿0 and ￿1 as the respective values of ￿. Clearly, ￿1 < ￿0
and ￿1 < ￿0.
In general, the e⁄ects of a transaction cost reduction di⁄er across down-
stream markets. Some products that were not produced will become prof-
itable. In addition, the set of products where equilibrium royalties are con-
strained by downstream pro￿tability shrinks, (i.e., ￿1 ￿ ￿1 < ￿0 ￿ ￿0) and
the pro￿tability constraint relaxes in the markets that remain constrained.
This a⁄ects equilibrium royalties and hence retail prices in some markets.
The resource costs of licensing also reduce. In what follows, we discuss the
implications of these e⁄ects for consumers, downstream manufacturers, IP
owners, and total welfare.
First, consider the e⁄ect on equilibrium royalties. From (7) it is clear
that equilibrium royalties are unchanged for products where the original
equilibrium was not constrained by downstream pro￿tability (￿ ￿ ￿0). The
exact change in royalties in other markets depends on the size of the trans-
action cost reduction. If the cost reduction is large enough, all products
that were pro￿t constrained at s0 (n) become unconstrained at s1 (n), that
is, ￿1 < ￿0. For smaller cost reductions, some of these products remain
11Royalty
constant
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Figure 3: E⁄ects on equilibrium royalties of a transaction cost reduction,
assuming that n ￿ 2 and ￿1 > ￿0. The dotted line shows the equilibrium
royalties for pro￿t-constrained products at s0 (n) and the solid black line
shows the equilibrium royalties at s1 (n) as well as the equilibrium royalties
for unconstrained products at s0 (n).
pro￿t constrained at s1 (n) and ￿0 < ￿1 < ￿0. However, in either case, the
royalties for all products that were constrained at the original transaction
cost (￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0) increase, because equilibrium royalties for constrained
products are negatively related to s(n), and unconstrained equilibrium roy-
alties always exceed the constrained equilibrium level for a given ￿. Finally,
products in ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 were not produced in equilibrium at s0 (n), but will
be produced at s1 (n) at a positive royalty level. The following proposition
summarizes this analysis.
Proposition 4 A transaction cost reduction from s0 (n) to s1 (n) leaves
equilibrium royalties unchanged for products that were not pro￿t constrained
at s0 (n) (￿ ￿ ￿0), equilibrium royalties increase in markets that were pro￿t-
constrained at s0 (n) (￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0), and new products in ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 are
produced at positive royalties.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 4. The impact on equilibrium royalties
relative to the joint optimum royalty depends on ￿. From Proposition 2, if
￿ > 0, equilibrium royalties never exceed the joint optimum, thus reducing
transaction costs never harms IP owners in this case because it only takes
them closer to the joint optimum. On the other hand, if ￿ < 0, equilibrium
royalties may exceed the joint optimum and a transaction cost reduction will
make IP owners worse o⁄ in some markets. IP owners in pro￿t-constrained
markets where the equilibrium royalty at s0 (n) already exceeds the joint
optimum (4
p
s0 (n) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0) will be made worse o⁄ as equilibrium roy-
alties increase further beyond the optimum. In addition, some IP owners
12in pro￿t-constrained markets where the original equilibrium royalty was be-
low the joint optimum may be made worse o⁄, if the equilibrium royalties
increase su¢ ciently far beyond the joint optimum.
Due to these e⁄ects, when ￿ < 0, it is possible that the aggregate welfare
of IP owners (measured by total royalty revenues) may decrease following
a transaction cost reduction. This occurs if equilibrium royalties increase
beyond the joint optimum by a su¢ ciently large amount in su¢ ciently many
markets that the harm in these markets exceeds the bene￿ts in the markets
where equilibrium royalties remain below the joint optimum plus the ben-
e￿ts from the production of new products. In particular, the total royalty




n ￿ r￿ (￿) ￿ x(r￿ (￿))
A
d￿. (11)
Evaluating (11) yields the following result.
Proposition 5 In aggregate, a transaction cost reduction increases total
royalty revenues if (2 ￿ n)￿ < 1. This is true for any feasible ￿ if n ￿ 2. If
n > 2, it requires ￿ > 1=(2 ￿ n). Otherwise, total royalty revenues decrease.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This result says that the aggregate e⁄ects of a transaction cost reduction
on IP owners depends on the substitutability among IP rights relative to
their number. Provided that IP rights are su¢ ciently substitutable, IP
owners are not made worse o⁄ in aggregate, as the negative e⁄ects (if any)
from a worsening of the tragedy of the anticommons are relatively small.
This is always true for n ￿ 2 or ￿ > 0. If n > 2, the range of negative values
of ￿ in which IP owners are better o⁄ shrinks as n increases. Recall from
Proposition 3 that an increase in n increases the ratio of equilibrium royalties
to the joint optimum when ￿ < 0, while increasing ￿ reduces the ratio in
unconstrained markets. Thus when n is higher, to generate an aggregate
improvement in the welfare of IP owners from a transaction cost reduction,
the substitutability of IP rights must also be higher.
Next consider the e⁄ects on downstream manufacturers. From Proposi-
tion 4, manufacturers of products that were not pro￿t-constrained in equi-
librium at s0 (n) (￿ ￿ ￿0) are better o⁄ by the amount of s0 (n) ￿ s1 (n),
as the royalties that they face are unchanged while their transaction costs
decrease. Manufacturers of products that are pro￿t-constrained in equilib-
rium at s1 (n) (￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1) are indi⁄erent to a transaction cost reduction.
All such manufacturers were either pro￿t-constrained or did not produce
anything at s0 (n), so they make zero pro￿ts both s0 (n) and s1 (n). Finally,
some products that were pro￿t-constrained in equilibrium at s0 (n) will be-
come unconstrained at s1 (n) (for ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0). Thus the equilibrium
pro￿ts for such manufacturers become strictly positive. Overall, since no
13individual manufacturers are worse o⁄ and some are better o⁄, aggregate
manufacturer pro￿t increases. The following proposition summarizes these
results.
Proposition 6 In aggregate, manufacturers are always better o⁄ from a
transaction cost reduction. Individually, those in markets that are pro￿t-
constrained in equilibrium at s1 (n) are indi⁄erent, while those in markets
that are unconstrained in equilibrium at s1 (n) are better o⁄.
Next let us consider the e⁄ect on consumers as measured by consumer
surplus in the downstream markets. Consumers of new products (￿1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿0) are better o⁄. Consumers in markets that were pro￿t-constrained
in equilibrium at s0 (n) (￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0) are made worse o⁄ because the
higher equilibrium royalties in such markets result in higher retail prices.
Consumers of products that were unconstrained in equilibrium at s0 (n)
(￿ ￿ ￿0) are indi⁄erent, as the royalties and hence retail prices for such
products remain unchanged.
The overall e⁄ect on consumers depends on the tradeo⁄ between the
positive e⁄ect of the introduction of new products, with the negative e⁄ect









Evaluating (12) and and examining how it changes with s(n), together with
the above discussion gives the following result.
Proposition 7 In aggregate, consumers are better o⁄ from a transaction
cost reduction if ￿ > 1=(2n ￿ 1), otherwise they are worse o⁄. Individually,
consumers in markets that were pro￿t-constrained at s0 (n) are worse o⁄,
those in unconstrained markets at s0 (n) are indi⁄erent, and consumers of
new products are better o⁄.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This result says that provided IP rights are su¢ ciently substitutable rel-
ative to n, consumers in aggregate are better o⁄ from a transaction cost
reduction. When IP rights are highly substitutable, the increases in equi-
librium royalties and hence retail prices in pro￿t-constrained markets never
outweigh the gains from introducing new products. However, the require-
ment on substitutability is strong, since the minimum value of ￿ at which
consumers are better o⁄, 1=(2n ￿ 1), is always greater than zero.
In terms of total welfare, there are three basic e⁄ects of a reduction in
s(n). The ￿rst is the direct e⁄ect that transaction costs of manufacturers are
reduced, which raises welfare. Second, royalties increase in some markets,
which reduces consumption and welfare in these markets. Third, some new
14products are introduced, which increases welfare. The overall impact on
welfare is the balance of these three e⁄ects.
Proposition 8 Equilibrium total welfare increases for any transaction cost
reduction if
s0 (n) ￿
4A2 (1 ￿ ￿)
4
￿
(2n(n + 1) + 3)￿2 ￿ (8 + 6n)￿ + 7
￿2. (13)
In addition, if
n ￿ 2 ￿
p
3(n ￿ 1)




then any parameter values that satisfy the assumption (2) also satisfy (13).
Otherwise, if (13) does not hold, the transaction cost reduction must be
su¢ ciently large to increase welfare. The required transaction cost reduction
increases with n and decreases with ￿.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This result says that if IP rights are su¢ ciently substitutable relative
to n, any transaction cost reduction, no matter how small, will improve
welfare. In such a case, the welfare losses due to increases in royalties in
constrained markets are never so large that they outweigh the positive ef-
fects of the introduction of new products and the reduced resource costs of
licensing. Alternatively, if the initial transaction cost s0 (n) is low enough,
the negative e⁄ects of higher equilibrium royalties from a transaction cost
reduction will be con￿ned to relatively few pro￿t-constrained markets, and
will not outweigh the positive welfare e⁄ects.17
Otherwise, if neither of these two conditions are satis￿ed, the transaction
cost reduction must be large enough so that the positive e⁄ects outweigh
the negative e⁄ects of higher equilibrium royalties in constrained markets.
Since it is not possible to reduce transaction costs below s(n) = 0, it may be
the case that eliminating transaction costs will not improve welfare. If this
occurs it implies that the tragedy of the anticommons is su¢ ciently prevalent
that the disciplining e⁄ect of transaction costs on equilibrium royalties is the
most important factor in the total welfare e⁄ects.








2n2 ￿ 4n ￿ 3
￿
there exist para-
meter values that satisfy ￿ ￿ 1=n and (2) such that welfare never improves
from any transaction cost reduction.








which shrinks as s(n) reduces because ￿ ￿ 1=n.
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Figure 4: A comparison of the parameter regions implied by the aggregate
welfare results (not to scale). Above the light grey line, a transaction cost
reduction makes consumers better o⁄. Above the dashed line, total welfare is
guaranteed to improve. Between the dashed and dotted lines, total welfare
improves if the transaction cost reduction is su¢ ciently large. Below the
dotted line, total welfare may not improve even if transaction costs are
eliminated. Above the dark grey line, IP owners are better o⁄.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Figure 4 compares the parameter regions obtained in the aggregate wel-
fare results, taking n as continuous for simplicity. If substitutability of IP
rights is very high, a transaction cost reduction makes consumers better
o⁄ (above the light grey line). Total welfare is guaranteed to improve at
su¢ ciently high negative values of ￿ (above the dashed line), while lower
values require a large enough transaction cost reduction to improve welfare
(between the dashed and dotted lines). If substitutability is very low (below
the dotted line), total welfare may not improve even if transaction costs are
eliminated. IP owners are better o⁄for intermediate values of substitutabil-
ity (above the dark grey line).
Although the particular results shown in Figure 4 are driven by our par-
ticular assumptions such as linear downstream demand and a uniform distri-
bution of demand intercepts, these results demonstrate the tension between
the total welfare e⁄ects and the e⁄ects on consumers and IP owners. Con-
sumers are easily made worse o⁄ by a transaction cost reduction as royalty
increases can span many markets, while the introduction of new products
will necessarily be in low demand and hence low consumer surplus markets.
Thus a transaction cost reduction that improves overall welfare may make
consumers worse o⁄, independent of who pays the transaction costs. In ad-
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Figure 5: Summary of e⁄ects on royalties and welfare in downstream markets
of a transaction cost reduction where ￿1 > ￿0.
does not improve, if substitutability is moderately low, so that royalty in-
creases cause su¢ ciently much harm to consumers, but the increases are not
so large that the aggregate e⁄ects on IP owners are negative.
Finally, as discussed above, the e⁄ects of a transaction cost reduction
di⁄er substantially across downstream markets. Figure 5 summarizes these
e⁄ects assuming that ￿1 > ￿0. In general, the incentives of individual
manufacturers and IP owners to use a cost-reducing clearinghouse di⁄er
from each other and from total welfare. While manufacturers are never
made worse o⁄, the same can be said for IP owners only if IP rights are
relatively substitutable, so that ￿ > 0. If ￿ < 0, IP owners may be worse
o⁄ in markets with intermediate values of ￿.
These results have implications for the operation of a clearinghouse busi-
ness. A clearinghouse will need to attract both manufacturers and IP owners
to use its services. However, as Figure 5 shows, the incentives of manufac-
turers and IP owners to join a clearinghouse are not always aligned. Man-
ufacturers will always be (weakly) willing to join a clearinghouse, although
manufacturers of relatively low demand products may not be willing to pay
a price to do so. The demand by IP owners depends on the substitutability
of IP rights relative to their number, and downstream demand. If substi-
tutability is low, only IP owners in relatively low demand markets will be
willing to pay a price to join a clearinghouse, while IP owners in medium
demand markets may not be willing to join even if it is free. On the other
hand, if substitutability is high enough, all IP owners except those in rela-
tively high demand markets will be willing to pay to join.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have used a simple model of IP licensing to examine the ef-
fects of a reduction in costs associated with the licensing process on royalties
17and welfare. Our motivation was a desire to understand how IP clearing-
houses can a⁄ect markets for technology. We showed that noncooperative
royalty setting by IP owners can lead to the tragedy of the anticommons,
and that considerations of downstream pro￿tability can be a disciplining
device to o⁄set this. Therefore, a reduction in licensing costs can lead to
negative welfare e⁄ects that arise from higher equilibrium royalties, and this
can make IP owners and consumers worse o⁄, and in some cases can be suf-
￿ciently large to o⁄set the gains from the introduction of new downstream
products and reduced costs for manufacturers.
While we have used a model with fairly speci￿c assumptions in this
paper, we believe the qualitative results are reasonably robust to changes
in the particular assumptions. The basic results come from two sources.
First, IP owners have overlapping claims to a downstream product, and this
results in a tendency to set excessive royalties if substitutability of rights
is su¢ ciently low, and this is exacerbated if there are more IP rights per
downstream market. Second, there are transaction costs in licensing that
bear on the downstream decision to obtain licenses, and which can a⁄ect the
upstream strategic behavior of IP owners. These two things underpin the
basic intuition developed in this paper, and similar e⁄ects could be obtained
in alternative models with di⁄erent assumptions.
Our analysis was con￿ned to modeling a reduction in ￿xed licensing
costs that applied to all negotiations. We believe this is a useful ￿rst step in
understanding the implications of IP clearinghouses for markets for technol-
ogy, as it characterizes the full extent of the potential welfare implications of
an informational clearinghouse. An interesting next step for future research
would be to characterize the demand by manufacturers and IP owners that a
clearinghouse would face for its services. As we have seen, the welfare e⁄ects
on IP owners are complex, and some IP owners may be unwilling to join a
clearinghouse even if its services are provided for free. It would be useful to
understand the pro￿t-maximizing behavior of a third-party clearinghouse,
and the implications for welfare.
We have also maintained the assumption that royalties are set indepen-
dently by IP owners. In patent pools and copyright collectives, and under
some possible clearinghouse models, royalties may be set centrally on behalf
of IP owners. To the extent that this overcomes the tragedy of the anti-
commons and lowers royalties, it will be bene￿cial. However, as we have
seen, non-cooperative royalties may not be excessively high if IP rights are
su¢ ciently substitutable. It would be interesting to use our framework to
examine the e⁄ects of centralized royalty setting, in comparison with the
decentralized outcome, and determine the implications of centralization for
the welfare e⁄ects of a reduction in the costs of the licensing process. A
framework similar to that used in this paper could be used to compare the
four di⁄erent types of clearinghouse that we identi￿ed in terms of e⁄ects on
welfare, and the factors that a⁄ect the demand for the services of each type.
187 Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
If ri = r for all i, z = nr
￿
￿￿1 and the downstream pro￿tability constraint








￿ . We will show that any IP owner has an
incentive to undercut any r > 0 that satis￿es this constraint, when ￿ > 1=n.







































































￿ (2 ￿ (1 + n)￿)
2(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ r (14)
Note this is a linear function of r. First, it is easy to verify that this is
negative for all r > 0 when ￿ 2 (1=n;2=(n + 1)) as the intercept and slope
are both negative. For ￿ 2 [2=(n + 1);1], the intercept is negative, but the
slope is positive. However, the maximum r at which downstream produc-




















but the right-hand side of this expression is less than or equal to zero for















Proof of Proposition 1
From lemma 1 we know that when ￿ > 1=n, any symmetric royalty
r > 0 cannot be an equilibrium. If r = 0 and ￿ > 1=n, the manufacturer￿ s
cost minimization problem does not have a unique solution, but any level
of output can be achieved at zero marginal cost using only a single input if
necessary. Thus if all other licensors are setting zero royalties, no individual
19licensor can increase revenues by setting a strictly positive royalty, so r = 0
is an equilibrium.
If ￿ ￿ 1=n, ignoring the downstream pro￿tability constraint for now,








2 ￿ (1 + n)￿
(15)
It is straightforward but very tedious to verify that the second-order
condition for a maximum of Ri is satis￿ed by (15) when ￿ ￿ 1=n, thus
this value of r satis￿es the conditions for a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Substituting (15) into the pro￿tability constraint (4) gives
￿ ￿




If (16) does not hold, suppose that r is such that pro￿t is zero pro￿t, i.e.,















is positive for when (16) holds, thus it is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium as each IP owner cannot increase revenues by reducing ri, and
will cause the manufacturer to cease production if ri increases.
Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium royalty exceeds the joint optimum if ￿ > 1. First sup-
pose ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A. Then from (10), ￿ > 1 implies 2(1 ￿ n￿) > 2 ￿ (1 + n)￿,
or ￿ (1 ￿ n) > 0. If ￿ > 0 this is never true, while if ￿ < 0 it is true pro-
vided n > 1. Thus equilibrium royalties for products in the range ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A
never exceed the joint optimum if ￿ > 0, while if ￿ < 0 they equal the joint
optimum if n = 1 and exceed it if n > 1.
Now suppose that ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. Then from (10), ￿ > 1 implies ￿ >
4
p




s(n). However, ￿ > 4
p
s(n)
implies ￿ (1 ￿ n) > 0. This is true if ￿ < 0 and n > 1, but not true if ￿ > 0.
Thus ￿ > 1 is possible when ￿ < 0, n > 1 and 4
p
s(n) < ￿ ￿ ￿. But ￿ > 1
contradicts ￿ ￿ ￿ when ￿ > 0, so ￿ > 1 is not possible for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ when
￿ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Using (8) and (7) to evaluate (11), after some manipulation we obtain
TR =
(1 ￿ n￿)(1 ￿ ￿)A2
6(2 ￿ ￿ (1 + n))
2 +
















Since ￿ ￿ 1=n, 1 ￿ n￿ ￿ 0. Thus TR is a decreasing function of s(n) if
(2 ￿ n)￿ > 1, otherwise it is an increasing function.
Proof of Proposition 7
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The sign of this is the same as the sign of 1￿(2n ￿ 1)￿. Thus if 1=(2n ￿ 1) <
￿ ￿ 1=n, CS is a strictly increasing function of s(n), otherwise it is a
decreasing function.
Proof of Proposition 8











Evaluating, after some manipulation we obtain
W =
(7 ￿ ￿ (3 + 4n))(1 ￿ ￿)A2









2 ￿ s(n) (19)
which can be written as W (s(n)) = a+b
q
s(n)
3 ￿s(n). Welfare improves


















3. Given s0 (n), this slope decreases as s1 (n) decreases, since
p
x3 is
a strictly convex function. Thus if (20) is satis￿ed for a marginal decrease
21in s(n) from s0 (n) it will also be satis￿ed for any larger decrease. This im-
plies that if 3
2
p
s0 (n) ￿ 1
b then any transaction cost reduction will increase
welfare, which requires
s0 (n) ￿
4A2 (1 ￿ ￿)
4
￿
(2n(n + 1) + 3)￿2 ￿ (8 + 6n)￿ + 7
￿2. (21)
Comparing this with (2), we see that any parameters that satisfy (2) also
satisfy (21) if
￿
2n2 ￿ 2n ￿ 1
￿
￿2 ￿ 2￿ (n ￿ 2) ￿ 1 ￿ 0. If n = 1 this is true
for any possible ￿. If n ￿ 2, the coe¢ cient on ￿2 is positive and the roots
of the quadratic in ￿ are
￿ =
n ￿ 2 ￿
p
3(n ￿ 1)
2n2 ￿ 2n ￿ 1
.
It is easily veri￿ed that the larger root exceeds 1=n for n ￿ 2, thus (21)
always holds for any parameter values that satisfy (2) if ￿ is between the
lower root and 1=n. Observe that this includes all values where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1=n.
Otherwise, if ￿ < 0 and (21) does not hold, (20) may still hold if s1 (n)
is small enough. In such a case, for a given s0 (n), if b is larger, s1 (n) must
be smaller to satisfy (20). It is easily veri￿ed that @b
@n > 0 and @b
@￿ < 0.
Proof of corollary 1
From (19), it is clear that W (0) > 0 and W is decreasing in s(n) at




always positive. Thus W is U-shaped in s(n) and welfare does not increase
for any transaction cost reduction if W (0) ￿ W (s0 (n)). This requires
s0 (n) ￿ 1=b2 where b is the coe¢ cient on
q
s(n)
3 in (19). In addition,
the parameters must satisfy (2). After some rearrangement, there exist
parameters that satisfy (2) and s0 (n) ￿ 1=b2 if
￿
4n ￿ 2n2 + 3
￿
￿2￿10￿+5 <
0. This is never true for any ￿ < 1=n if n = 1 or n = 2. If n ￿ 3, the





2n2 ￿ 4n ￿ 3
.
The larger root exceeds 1=n, so there exist parameters where welfare does
not increase for any transaction cost reduction if ￿ is less than the lower
root.
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